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OUR PATENT SYSTEM AND HEALTH 
CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: 
VALUABLE INCENTIVE OR 
IMPEDIMENT TO INNOVATION? 
GARY MONTLE*, RYAN LEVY**, AND MARGARET 
ROWLAND*** 
INTRODUCTION 
Patentable inventions have often been transformative, but the pace 
of such innovation has changed exponentially in the last thirty years.  The 
patent law still seeks to reward ingenuity and nowhere should this maxim 
be truer than in the area of health information technology.  But the pace and 
scope of changes in that arena have made rewarding that ingenuity with a 
patent increasingly difficult.  The courts have struggled to apply patent laws 
to technology that is new and novel to a fault.  This Article seeks to address 
how it is possible to continue to reward ingenuity in a field where progress 
will save not just money but lives. 
PART I. HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
The U.S. health care system is in dire straits due to issues such as 
“increasing demand, spiraling costs, inconsistent and poor quality of care, 
and inefficient, poorly coordinated care systems.”1  In 2000, the World 
Health Organization “ranked the U.S. health care system 37th out of 191 
and identified our poor use of information technology as among the primary 
reasons for this ‘dismal’ ranking.”2  More recently, the Commonwealth 
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Fund ranked our overall health care system last compared to ten other first-
world countries, particularly in terms of access, efficiency, and equity.3  
These rankings are even more troubling considering our health care system 
is the most expensive in the world.4  In 2011, our health expenditures per 
capita were $8,508.5  This year alone, our government is projected to spend 
somewhere between $3.1 and $3.8 trillion on health care.6 Projections for 
2015 are even larger.7  Furthermore, the U.S. Census Bureau has estimated 
that by 2050 there will be approximately 88.5 million Americans over the 
age of sixty-five, half a million of which will be centenarians.8  This means 
improved health care services will be crucial to effectively manage and 
treat our aging population.  Needless to say, health care in the United States 
is in desperate need of reform. 
Health information technology (“HIT”) is increasingly viewed as 
critical to dramatically transforming the health care industry by improving 
the overall efficiency and quality of the health delivery system,9 which in 
turn can help “save lives, cut costs, and expand access to care.”10  
Specifically, it can be used “to harness real-time information from a variety 
of data sources to respond to the needs of patients and providers in a timely 
manner, improve quality, reduce costs, identify and track disease outbreaks, 
and manage large patient populations.”11  The importance of incentivizing 
HIT innovation is widely recognized and hard to overstate. 
So what exactly is HIT? It can be generally defined as “the 
application of information processing involving both computer hardware 
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and software that deals with the storage, retrieval, sharing, and use of health 
care information, data, and knowledge for communication and decision 
making.”12  “[It] is often considered a silent partner in healthcare—not seen 
by patients, but a critical part of the system.”13  In a similar vein, the U.S. 
National Library of Medicine defines health informatics as “the 
interdisciplinary study of the design, development, adoption, and 
application of IT-based innovations in healthcare services delivery, 
management and planning.”14  It is a collection of tools and mechanisms by 
which someone can use sophisticated algorithms to search, filter, and 
process relevant medical information.  Simply put, health informatics is the 
science (or, the how and the why) behind health care IT.15  The Office of 
the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (“ONC”) 
further explained that these technologies “enable the secure collection and 
exchange of vast amounts of health data about individuals.”16  This vast 
amount of data is generally referred to as “big data.”17  The technological 
ability to securely collect, store, exchange, analyze, and convert this into 
valuable, useable information in a tolerable time is what makes HIT 
innovations so critical to the future of our health care system. 
In 2011, U.S. health care data18 alone reached 150 exabytes.19  To 
put this figure into perspective, one exabyte is equal to 
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1,000,000,000,000,000,000, or 1018 bytes.20  “Five exabytes is equivalent in 
size to the information contained in half a million new libraries the size of 
the Library of Congress print collection.”21  According to the same source, 
“five exabytes is twenty-five times all the printed information in the 
world.”22  One hundred fifty exabytes is also fifteen times larger than the 
estimated total storage capacity of all of Google’s data centers combined.23  
It is predicted that if the growth of information continues at this rate, health 
care data will soon reach zettabyte (1021 bytes) scale and even yottabytes 
(1024 bytes) not long after.24  “Unfortunately, not enough of this deluge of 
[structured and unstructured] data sets has been systematically collected 
and stored, and therefore this valuable information has not been aggregated, 
analyzed, or made available in a format to be readily accessed to improve 
healthcare.”25 
Why is mining this mother lode of raw, untapped medical data such 
a big deal?  Simply put, it matters because the meaningful utilization of this 
data “has the power to fundamentally change health care in this country.”26  
Leveraging the knowledge gained from innovative HIT informatics “can 
dramatically improve safety, research, quality, and cost efficiency, all of 
which are critical factors necessary to facilitate health care reform.”27  HIT 
analytics “can be applied to better hospital operations, track outcomes for 
clinical and surgical procedures, including length of stay, readmission rates, 
infection rates, mortality, and comorbidity prevention,” and “to benchmark 
effectiveness-to-cost models.”28  The continued adoption of HIT 
innovations enhances physicians’ ability “to identify, monitor, and 
coordinate care for their patients, particularly those with chronic 
conditions.”29 
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HIT also has a close relationship with the health industry’s overall 
costs.  As one scholar stated, “there can be little doubt that a good part of 
the hundreds of billions of dollars wasted in American health care annually 
is due to information failures.”30  Indeed, the McKinsey Global Institute 
“calculates that the U.S. health care system could save $300 billion 
annually if the industry unleashed the full economic potential of data and 
analytics, a significant portion of which could reduce national health 
expenditures” by almost eight percent.31 
To better understand the magnitude of potential benefits derived 
from HIT innovation, it is helpful to examine the tangible impact it has 
already made.  For example, innovations in healthcare informatics have led 
to breakthroughs in Parkinson’s disease and cancer research.  Intel and the 
Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson’s Research are collaborating on a 
research initiative that “utilizes a big data analytics platform which detects 
patterns collected from wearable technologies used to monitor symptoms” 
and “can create a new paradigm for measurement of Parkinson’s disease.”32  
This coupling of data science and wearable computing provides invaluable 
information for a disease that is notoriously difficult to monitor due to its 
variability.33  With respect to cancer, one company uses “advanced imaging 
registration algorithms” to “align[] the unstructured imaging and treatment 
data” which creates “a clinical knowledge repository on every patient 
treated,” and “deliver[s] analytics to assist providers with medical 
decisions.”34  Furthermore, population-based analytics can then be applied 
to this base “to help oncologists understand how they are treating their 
patients for outcomes research and reporting.”35 
Furthermore, there is evidence of the beneficial impact of HIT 
innovation on a local level.  Vanderbilt Medical Center (“VUMC”) has 
begun to “embed[] analytics in clinical workflow” and already “achieved 
demonstrable results.”36  A 2012 Sage Growth Partners Industry Report 
stated that: 
                                                 
 30. Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health 
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[VUMC] has deployed analytics to gauge expected versus 
observed clinical outcomes.  Their efforts to decrease 
Ventilated Acquired Pneumonia (VAP), with cases 
numbering upward of 300,000 cases per year in the United 
States, provide tangible proof of their success in engaging 
analytics to improve health status.  Their clinical team 
established eight measures that help alleviate VAP [].  
They implemented evidence-based order sets and then 
created real-time dashboards for the points of care that 
inform the nursing staff on compliance with the eight 
measures.  When they analyzed their data, they discovered 
that compliance on the measures was up significantly, but 
health status had not improved commensurately with the 
level of effort and improved compliance.  Consequently, 
they conducted a subset analysis that showed that 
compliance with all eight of measures provided the tipping 
point to avoiding VAP.  They began a new indicator for 
nurses that provided real-time data on full compliance with 
all eight measures.  When implemented, they noted a 
radical drop in VAP.  [Director of Information Technology 
Integration at VUMC,] Dr. [Ed] Shultz noted that ‘people 
are now comparing us to best of breed, where we were just 
average in the past.  It is really an analytics victory in the 
ability to see patterns that would have been invisible 
without the data warehouse to see that retrospective 
analysis and real-time reporting.’37 
Vanderbilt is just one of a growing number of health care 
organizations that are seeing the advantages of HIT analytics. The Ohio 
State University’s Wexner Medical Center uses data algorithms “to identify 
patients in need of intervention and personalize care for those individuals in 
order to reduce initial hospitalization as well as readmissions.”38  Similarly, 
the Wyoming Department of Health, by using a program called WYhealth, 
which mines Medicaid data and utilizes a population health platform, was 
able to reduce patient emergency room visits by twenty percent and 
improve its thirty-day hospital readmission rate in just one year.39  The 
Louisiana State University Health Care Services Division and the Tobacco 
Control Initiative were even able to use a health informatics system to 
                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. Neil Versel, Analytics Gives Patient Care, Safety a Lift, HEALTH CARE IT NEWS, 
Aug. 4, 2014, at 18, available at http://www.pageturnpro.com/HIMSS-Media/59913-
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assess the effect of a federal cigarette tax increase on the readiness to quit 
smoking among low-income smokers in the state.40  The University of 
Pittsburgh Medical Center (“UPMC”) “has put $105 million toward a 
massive data analytics program, which is employed to analyze the success 
of a patient-centered medical home pilot.  UPMC found that those with 
medical homes had substantially better health outcomes after six months in 
the program, and the medical home reduced health expenditures by $15 
million in the first year.”41  Its School of Health Sciences is in the process 
of building an electrocardiogram database that researchers can analyze in 
order to further refine cardiopulmonary resuscitation interventions and thus 
save more lives.42 
Recently, Mayo Clinic researchers founded Ambient Clinical 
Analytics, a venture that “aims to bring data assimilation, communication 
and analytics to the bedside.”43  One of the platform’s tools “is a clinical 
EMR [electronic medical records] technology that combats information 
overload by using analytics to filter relevant patient data and support best-
care practices for ICUs and ORs.”44  Other “scientifically-validated tools” 
include the patented Septic Shock Sniffer and patent-pending Ventilator-
Induced Lung Injury Sniffer, which provide smart alerts to address various 
hospital dangers.45 
In addition, according to the results of a two-year study done by 
Aetna Innovation Labs and a data analytics firm, big data analytics were 
able to predict the future risk of metabolic syndrome on both an individual 
and population level.46  The individualized reports predicted not only which 
of the patients was at a high risk of having metabolic syndrome and 
developing it within the next year, but also which specific factors would be 
the cause of it.47  This type of report allows a patient and their doctor to take 
personalized steps to mitigate this risk.48  It is particularly useful technology 
since metabolic syndrome can lead to conditions such as chronic heart 
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disease, stroke, and diabetes; three things which, combined, “account for 
nearly twenty percent of all healthcare costs in the U.S.” and affects one-
third of American adults.49  “The analytical models used also helped 
identify individual variable impact on risk associated with adherence to 
prescribed medication,” an issue that costs this country $300 billion 
annually.50 
HIT informatics even helps combat healthcare fraud. Data analysis 
is being used by Medicare and Medicaid to help “identify[] improper claims 
before they are paid and [to] detect[] other patterns of fraud and abuse.”51  
This is notable considering that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
“estimates that fraudulent billings to public and private health care 
programs are 3–10 percent of total health spending, or $75–$250 billion.”52  
Additionally, these anti-fraud programs help “prevent the harm to patients 
who are fraudulently exposed to radiation, invasive surgeries, and 
medications they do not need, or suffer the lasting consequences of 
receiving a fraudulent diagnosis.”53 
There can be little dispute as to the value, both actual and potential, 
of HIT informatics.  Indeed, an exhaustive study found that ninety-two 
percent of recent articles on HIT “reached conclusions that were positive 
overall.”54  The Cleveland Clinic even identified “Harnessing Big Data to 
Improve Healthcare” as one of the top ten most important medical 
innovations of 2012.55  Given its significance, it only seems logical to 
incentivize groundbreaking health care advances in dynamic big data 
technology. 
PART II. BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS & THE § 101 KICKBACK 
In view of the foregoing section, HIT informatics might logically 
be seen as a category of innovations that our patent system was created to 
promote.  However, these technologies typically have several 
characteristics that arguably cloud their consideration for patent eligibility. 
HIT informatics are rarely tethered to a specific device, system, or network, 
but rather are intended for distributed operation across an array of 
                                                 
 49. Id. at 1. 
 50. Id. at 1–2. 
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2015] HEALTH CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 101 
hardware.56  HIT informatics, at least in the context used most frequently 
here, are not directly transformative.  The relevant technologies more often 
constitute decision support or status indications for healthcare entities, 
rather than providing actual control over a device or system, for example in 
the form of tangible inputs.57  It may further be persuasively argued that 
HIT informatics, even while implemented by definition in tangible 
hardware of some form, do not themselves define an improved version of 
the hardware, but rather provide an improved result upon execution. 
This section will focus on the difficulties which have arisen in the 
patent law with respect to the aforementioned characteristics, and why they 
may be relevant to patent protection for future innovations in HIT. 
A. Principles of Patent Subject Matter Eligibility 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution 
empowers the U.S. Congress, in pertinent form, “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”58  This power conferred to 
Congress is otherwise open with respect to implementation, except that the 
Clause arguably embodies a mandate that any patent system must 
effectively “promote,” rather than impede, innovation for the betterment of 
society.59 
                                                 
 56. See, e.g., Rakesh Agrawal, et al., Enabling the 21st Century Health Care 
Information Technology Revolution, 50 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 36 (2007) 
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Infrastructure, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
https://www.health.ny.gov/technology/technical_infrastructure.htm (last updated Jan. 2009) 
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Perpetuating siloed information systems that do not interconnect will significantly impede 
the adoption and effective use of health IT tools, including electronic health records. 
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disparate clinicians, other authorized entities, and patients, while ensuring security, privacy, 
and other protections.”). 
 57. Id.; see also N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 56 (“[A]spects of the 
technical infrastructure include electronic health records and personal health records, and 
clinical informatics services which refer to the tools required for the aggregation, analysis, 
decision support and reporting of data for various quality and public health purposes.”). 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 59. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (noting that 
productive efforts fostered by incentives in the patent laws “will have a positive effect on 
society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the 
economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our 
citizens.”). 
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In keeping with this mandate, Section 1 of the original Patent Act 
of 1793 defines patent eligible subject matter as including “any new and 
useful art, machine, manufacture[,] or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement [thereof].”60  The Supreme Court has long 
considered the language of Congress as being expansive in scope, noting in 
at least one instance that it “embodied [Patent Act author Thomas] 
Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement.’”61  An oft-cited excerpt from legislative history 
accompanying the 1952 Patent Act, the most recent iteration, further 
clarifies Congress’ intent for patent-eligible subject matter to “include 
anything under the sun that is made by man.”62  The Supreme Court itself 
has “more than once cautioned that courts should not read into the patent 
laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.”63  
Section 101 has therefore often been described as a “coarse eligibility 
filter” for inventions which otherwise can satisfy the remaining statutory 
criteria for patentability, namely those that are novel, useful, and non-
obvious.64 
However coarse the filter may be, it has consistently been 
considered to preclude patent eligibility for those discoveries that are mere 
“manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”65  The Supreme Court has “long held that § 101, which defines the 
subject matter eligible for patent protection, contains an implicit exception 
for ‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”66  It has 
“interpreted § 101 and its predecessors in light of this exception for more 
than 150 years.”67  Of particular concern is that monopolization of “the 
basic tools of scientific and technological work” should not be patentable, 
as it might otherwise “tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to 
promote it.”68  However, courts must be wary in applying these 
exclusionary principles in a way that would “eviscerate patent law,” as “all 
                                                 
 60. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (1793) (current version at 
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952)). 
 61. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980) (quoting Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807), in 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 74, 
75–76 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854)). 
 62. Id. at 309 (citing S. REP. NO. 82-1979, 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1979, 6 
(1952)). 
 63. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 182 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64. Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 65. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 66. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2350 (2014) (quoting 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). 
 67.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3218; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 
U.S. 62, 112–121 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853)). 
 68. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 
(2012) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67). 
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inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”69 
Turning more particularly to the issue of “business method 
patents,” it should first be noted that such inventions under English law 
have been deemed patentable since at least 1778, fifteen years prior to the 
enacting of the original U.S. Patent Act.70  Business method patents have 
been issued in the United States as well since at least the late 1700s.71  The 
1952 iteration of the Patent Act further replaces the word “art” with 
“process,” “in order to clarify its meaning,” but otherwise maintains the 
language from 1793.72  There is no apparent qualification to the term, and 
indeed it has been noted that § 101 “extends patent eligibility to any 
process[,] not ‘some’ or even ‘most,’ but all processes that are not ‘a law of 
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea.’”73  Perhaps more importantly, 
the term “process” by itself does not presuppose any technological 
requirements, but rather has “been broadly defined by the courts as ‘a series 
of acts.’”74  Briefly stated, a comprehensive review of statutory and judicial 
authority yields a general acknowledgement as to the patentability of 
business methods.75 
Some persistent doubt remains among inventors and academics 
alike as to the historical accuracy, and ongoing vitality, of this 
acknowledgement.76  However, we note that any conclusions regarding the 
eligibility of “pure” business methods are likely beyond the scope of the 
present discussion, and no further clarity is proposed here.77  Paradigmatic 
                                                 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., D.F. Renn, John Knox’s Plan for Insuring Lives: A Patent of Invention in 
1778, 101 J. INST. ACTUARIES 285, 286 (1974) (describing the English grant of letters patent 
for a “[p]lan for assurances on lives of persons from 10 to 80 years of Age”). 
 71. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. X241 (issued Mar. 19, 1799); U.S. Patent No. 2310X 
(issued Apr. 28, 1815). 
 72. 98 CONG. REC. A415 (1952) (statement of Rep. Bryson). 
 73. Jamie Hopkins & John A. Pearce II, Workable Solutions to the Challenges of 
Patenting an Innovative Process, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 316, 320 (2014) (citing Reply Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellant at 6, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (No. 08-964) 2009 WL 
3453657). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (citing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)); see also Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876) (“That a process may be 
patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be 
disputed . . . . A process . . . is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter 
to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as 
patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3245–46 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (discussing in detail and citing to “an overarching theme, at least in dicta: 
Business methods are not patentable arts”); see also Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of 
Novelty in Software Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217 (2013) (proposing a test “to rein 
in harmful business method software patents without affecting more deserving industrial 
patents.”). 
 77. Note, e.g., that even Justice Stevens, while rejecting patent-eligibility for “business 
methods,” has shrunk back from conflating analysis of such inventions with respect to 
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inventions regarding HIT analytics may instead be considered as being in 
the field of decision support, or otherwise technically oriented. Reduction to 
practice of such inventions is procured through technical innovation, and 
more particularly by computer implementation, in stark contrast with the 
stereotypical business method patents of legal precedent. 
In recent years, however, the issues regarding business method 
patents have become increasingly interrelated with those for computer 
implementations, or “software patents,” and this nexus is a primary catalyst 
for the concerns of this Article. Software itself has long been a bone of 
contention with regards to patent eligibility.78 Indeed, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) itself, along with numerous foreign 
jurisdictions, has maintained that software is per se ineligible, absent the 
recitation of otherwise statutory subject matter such as a non-transitory 
computer-readable medium.79 However, U.S. courts have never explicitly 
precluded software from patent eligibility, and indeed have demonstrated 
and periodically tweaked parameters by which software implementations 
may be deemed patentable. 
Patent drafters have essentially taken their cues from the courts 
and, at least since 1995, frequently have fashioned “software” claims which 
are directed to a computing device or a “computer-readable medium” 
including code, instructions, program modules, or the like executable to 
perform a process.80 As the continuing effectiveness of such “Beauregard 
claims” is in serious doubt, prudent claim drafters will adapt new 
techniques, based on a spectrum of precedent which includes those briefly 
described below. 
B. Modern Precedent Regarding Software and Business Method 
Patents 
Since the Supreme Court first addressed the patent-eligibility of 
computer software in 1972, the law has changed considerably, perhaps in 
keeping with the sweeping changes in how software affects daily life. 
Whereas this initial opinion of the Court, in Gottschalk v. Benson,81 has 
                                                                                                                 
“whether a piece of software” implemented by machine could be patented. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 
at 3247–48 n.40 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 78. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, et al., Life after Bilski, 63 STAN L. REV. 1315, 1317 
(2011) (“The patentability of software and business methods has a long and tortured 
history.”). 
 79. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2106(I) R-11.2013 (9th ed. 2014) [hereinafter MPEP] (“Non-limiting 
examples of claims that are not directed to one of the statutory categories” as including: “i. 
transitory forms of signal transmission (for example, a propagating electrical or 
electromagnetic signal per se), In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) . . . . vi. a 
computer program per se, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72, 175 USPQ at 676-77.”). 
 80. See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (ushering in a category of 
“computer-readable medium” claims colloquially referred to as “Beauregard claims”). 
 81. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
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often been interpreted as holding that software was not patent eligible, it is 
clear that the Court in subsequent cases has withdrawn from any blanket 
prohibition against patenting software.82  Equally apparent, however, is that 
inventions based solely on computer software implementation are not 
patent-eligible.83  Rather, the Court’s jurisprudence in this arena may aptly 
be summarized as the incremental deduction of circumstances by which 
computer software (or related processes) may, or may not, be patented.  The 
Court has highlighted particular decisions as precedential “guideposts” for 
adjudicating subject matter eligibility of software patents,84 and therefore it 
is with these decisions that we continue. 
The Benson Court held that a method of programming a general-
purpose computer to convert binary-coded decimal numerals to their 
equivalent pure binary numerals was not a “process” within the purview of 
the Patent Act, but rather an “algorithm” from which specific applications 
could be developed.85  The patent did not claim a particular “new and 
useful” application, and if ruled to be eligible, would have preempted 
known and future unknown uses of the algorithm in any field, for any 
purpose, and for any machinery, or even no machinery at all.86  Of 
particular relevance in recent cases, the Benson Court also ruled that 
computer implementation did not limit the invention, as the algorithm had 
no alternative practical application, and therefore “simply implementing a 
mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a computer, [i]s not 
a patentable application of that principle.”87 
A few years later, the Court in Parker v. Flook similarly 
characterized the invention at issue as nothing more than “a formula for 
computing an updated alarm limit,” such that the claims effectively 
amounted to a monopoly on the formula itself.88  This case has 
subsequently been oft-cited for the “proposition that the prohibition against 
patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the 
use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding 
‘insignificant postsolution activity.’”89  However, the Flook Court notably 
backed away from any broad preclusive effect on software patents 
themselves, noting that “[n]either the dearth of precedent, nor this decision, 
should therefore be interpreted as reflecting a judgment that patent 
protection of certain novel and useful computer programs will not promote 
                                                 
 82. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357–59 (2014) 
(discussing cases in which the Court has analyzed patent eligibility for software). 
 83. See id. 
 84. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–1301 (2012). 
 85. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–73). 
 86. Id. at 67–68. 
 87. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357–58 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 64). 
 88. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978). 
 89. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 
(1981)). 
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the progress of science and the useful arts, or that such protection is 
undesirable as a matter of policy.”90 
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court shortly thereafter found a 
computer-implemented process to be eligible, but the computer and its 
programming were not relevant to the holding.91  Rather, the fact that a 
claimed mathematical equation was “well-known” did not preclude patent 
eligibility where it used a “thermocouple” in a process designed to solve a 
technological problem in “conventional industry practice.”92  In other 
words, while the equation itself could not be patent-eligible, a specific 
inventive application which incorporates the equation was not barred under 
§ 101.93 
In view of this precedent, the newly-formed U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit developed and implemented a test for patent 
eligibility wherein claims were analyzed to determine if an “algorithm” was 
recited, and if so, whether the algorithm was applied to physical elements or 
process steps.94  Computer software-implemented patents were therefore 
patentable under the right conditions, but the number of such patents 
actually being issued during the 1980s and early 1990s was nonetheless 
relatively limited.95 
One case from this time period of particular relevance, at least in 
the context of this Article, is In re Meyer, in which the U.S. Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals (immediate predecessor of the Federal Circuit) 
addressed a patent application directed to a process for gathering 
neurological testing data, and using a formula to determine the functionality 
of certain neurological elements.96  Although the claimed method was 
computer-implemented, the Court rejected the notion that mere citation to a 
computer could make the claim eligible where the steps were otherwise 
substantially directed to a “mathematical algorithm,” i.e., the “thinking 
processes of a neurologist.”97 
                                                 
 90. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595. 
 91. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175 (1981); see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“[T]he claims in 
Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process, not 
because they were implemented on a computer.”). 
 92. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 178. 
 93. Id. at 187; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1292 (2012) (“In Diehr, the overall process was patent eligible because of the way 
the additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as a whole.”). 
 94. The so-called Freeman-Walter-Abele test survived in some form for over twenty 
years as a principal test for determining subject matter eligibility, particularly for algorithms. 
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959, n.17 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 95. See JAMES BESSEN, ET AL., THE SOFTWARE PATENT EXPERIMENT 5 (2004), 
available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/softpat.pdf (noting the dramatic increase 
during this time period thusly: “about 1,000 software patents a year were granted in the early 
1980s, increasing to about 5,000 a year in 1990. The rate doubled again by the by 1996. 
Nearly 25,000 software patents were granted in 2002.”). 
 96. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 793 (C.C.P.A.1982). 
 97. Id. at 794–95. 
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A truly favorable environment for software patents finally 
commenced in 1994 with the Federal Circuit’s ruling in In re Alappat, 
which eliminated the “physical elements” requirement for algorithms, at 
least in the context of apparatus claims.98  Rather, a “general purpose” 
computer, once specially programmed with software to execute particular 
functions, becomes patent-eligible as a “specific machine to produce a 
useful, concrete, and tangible result.”99  Patent drafters could now artfully 
dodge many, if not most, § 101 considerations with respect to appropriately 
recited software claims. 
The effects of Alappat were insignificant, however, compared to 
what followed when “[t]he so-called ‘rise’ or ‘proliferation’ of business 
method patents was kick-started in 1998”100 by the Federal Circuit in State 
Street and AT&T.101  In these cases the court extended the “useful, concrete, 
and tangible results” test from Alappat to further determine the patent-
eligibility of business methods.102  These Federal Circuit decisions 
substantially coincided with the “dot-com era,” the speculative investment 
bubble that centered on Internet companies and lasted from the mid-1990s 
to approximately 2000.103  It is thus no surprise that the number of 
applications filed for patents claiming methods related to online business 
practices “increased markedly.”104  The internal operations of the PTO were 
quickly overwhelmed with the intense pursuit of computer implemented 
business method inventions.105 
                                                 
 98. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Jamie Hopkins & John A. Pearce II, Workable Solutions to the Challenges of 
Patenting an Innovative Process, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 316, 318 (2014). 
 101. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 102. State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373 (“Today, we hold that the transformation of data, 
representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical 
calculations into a final share price, constitutes a [patent-eligible invention] . . . because it 
produces ‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’. . . .”); see also AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1358 
(“Because the claimed process applies the Boolean principle to produce a useful, concrete, 
tangible result without pre-empting other uses of the mathematical principle, on its face the 
claimed process comfortably falls within the scope of § 101.”). 
 103. See BRUCE D. SUNSTEIN, PATENT PREPARATION AND PROSECUTION UNDER 
UNCERTAIN PATENT ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.sunsteinlaw.com/media/BDS_Patent_Preparation.pdf (noting the explosion in 
patent filings corresponding to the “dot-com boom,” at least part of which was “certainly 
attributable not just to the State Street Bank decision but also to an economic environment in 
2000 that rewarded entrepreneurial activity involving Internet-based businesses”). 
 104. 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 5:31 (4th ed. 2013) (citing Jenna 
Greene, Staking a Claim: How State Street Has Spurred a Rush on the PTO, LEGAL TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2000, at 14). 
 105. See Chung K. Pak, Patenting E-Commerce Inventions: Perspective From an 
Administrative Patent Judge, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 447, 449 (2003) (“The 
number of new applications of these types filed in Class 705 (designated as business and 
management data processing class) increased from 1370 in Fiscal Year 1998 to 2600 in 
Fiscal Year 1999 and to 7800 in Fiscal Year 2000. The number of patents issued from these 
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Even after the dot-com bubble implosion of 2000–2001 software 
patents and computer implemented business method patents continued to 
issue at a breakneck pace.106  However, a decade later in In re Bilski the 
Federal Circuit “took a step away from its broad application of the common 
law exceptions” and developed the “machine-or-transformation” test as “the 
sole test to determine subject matter eligibility, abandoning all prior tests 
for patentable subject matter.”107  When the Supreme Court issued its ruling 
in Bikski v. Kappos in 2010, most notably rejecting the “machine or 
transformation” test as a universal standard for patent subject matter 
eligibility, the Court nonetheless found it to be a “useful and important clue, 
an investigative tool.”108  Some concerns in the patent bar were alleviated 
when the Supreme Court refrained from any “categorical rule denying 
patent protection” for computer programs, and indeed seemed to imply that 
the “machine or transformation” test was particularly ill-suited for 
“technologies from the Information Age.”109  This did not save the claims at 
issue, however, which were unanimously rendered ineligible by the Court 
as being directed to the mere “abstract idea” of hedging risk, limited only 
by field of use and mere “token postsolution components” or activities.110  
Alleged infringers reacted accordingly, and “[f]ollowing Bilski, the number 
of cases challenging business-related patents at the Federal Circuit 
predictably increased.”111 
C. The “Death of Hundreds of Thousands of Patents”? 
In 2012, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of patent eligibility 
in the case of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
which related to patents for a diagnostic and treatment method for 
autoimmune diseases.112  The Mayo Court introduced a two-part analytical 
framework for distinguishing patents that claim judicial exceptions from 
those that claim eligible subject matter in the form of particular applications 
                                                                                                                 
types of applications increased from a total of 447 prior to 1986 to a total of 2,850 as of the 
end of Fiscal Year 1999.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 106. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 103, at 2 (“Although the dot-com boom peaked in the 
year 2000, patent filings in Class 705 peaked a year later at 9,288. This one-year latency 
may reflect a delayed impact of the economic retreat. Following the dramatic drop in stock 
prices, particularly of technology-based start-ups following the dot-com boom in years after 
2000, filings in Class 705 declined in 2002, but since than have climbed back rather steadily, 
so that in 2006 the number of filings— 8,959—has nearly returned to 1999 levels.”). 
 107. Maayan Perel, Reviving the Gatekeeping Function: Optimizing the Exclusion 
Potential of Subject Matter Eligibility, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 237, 255 (2013). 
 108. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
 109. See id. at 3227–28. 
 110. Id. at 3231. 
 111. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 2:17 (2014). 
 112. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,132 S. Ct. 1289, 1290–91 
(2012). 
2015] HEALTH CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 109 
of those exceptions.113  First, a determination must be made as to whether 
the claims at issue are directed to one of the judicially-defined exceptions to 
patent-eligibility.114  If so, the elements of the claims are considered both 
individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether 
additional elements present an “inventive concept,” or something 
“significantly more” than just the exception itself.115 
Commentators initially dismissed the Mayo test as being 
inapplicable outside of the context of “natural law” exceptions, and indeed 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office responded directly to the ruling with 
new guidelines or instructions to that effect.116  However, in June of 2014 
the Supreme Court unequivocally ruled in Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank 
that the Mayo test was to be applied across the spectrum of patents, 
including those claiming an “abstract idea” exception as well as those 
claiming “laws of nature.”117  The Alice Court further cited the Mayo test in 
rejecting arguments that generic computer recitations could transform an 
“abstract idea” into a patent-eligible invention.118  Accordingly, what is 
hereinafter referred to as the Alice test is to be prospectively relied upon in 
determining subject matter eligibility for any computer-implemented 
invention, whether an apparatus, method, or otherwise.  Computer system 
and Beauregard-styled “computer readable medium” claims, without more 
than the mere presence of generic and conventional hardware components, 
are indeed given no better treatment with respect to § 101 than 
representative method claims.119 
Initial reaction to the Alice ruling was immediate and polarized, as 
proponents of software patents widely considered the Court to have, at least 
for the time being, “slammed the door shut for many, if not most, software 
patents.”120  Within weeks of Alice, district courts and the U.S. Patent 
Trademark Appeals Board had rejected a substantial number of computer-
                                                 
 113. Id. at 1294. 
 114. Id. at 1296–97. 
 115. Id. at 1298, 1294. 
 116. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2012 Interim Procedure for 
Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis of Process Claims Involving Laws of Nature, July 3, 
2012, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/law/exam/2012_interim_guidance.pdf 
(providing guidance in view of Mayo for claims which “involve laws of nature/natural 
correlations,” but further expressly noting that “[p]rocess claims that are directed to abstract 
ideas, such as the claims in Bilski, should continue to be examined using” prior guidance 
dating from 2010). 
 117. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) 
(“Because the claims at issue are directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, we 
turn to the second step in Mayo’s framework.”). 
 118. Id. at 2358. 
 119. Id. at 2360. 
 120. Gene Quinn, The History of Software Patents in the United States, IPWatchdog 
(Nov. 30, 2014, 10:30AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/11/30/the-history-of-
software-patents-in-the-united-states/id=52256/. 
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implemented patents with reference to the Supreme Court’s guidance.121  In 
some cases, the United States Patent and Trademark Office even issued 
rejections to patent applications that had already gone through examination 
and were considered allowable.122  One of the dissenting opinions from the 
Federal Circuit’s earlier ruling had gone so far as to predict that the 
majority’s decision would ultimately result in “the death of hundreds of 
thousands of patents, including all business method, financial system, and 
software patents as well as many computer implemented and 
telecommunications patents.”123 
Worth noting, however, is that nowhere in the Alice decision did 
the Supreme Court even use the word “software,” and the Court more 
explicitly stated, albeit in dicta, “that many computer-implemented claims 
are formally addressed to patent-eligible subject matter.”124  Further, only a 
concurring minority of Justices opined that business method patents should 
be categorically ineligible.125 
 
PART III. DRAFTING PATENT CLAIMS FOR INVENTIONS IN HIT 
ANALYTICS 
Our opinion is that prospective inventions should not, and will not, 
be dismissed as patent-ineligible solely because they are implemented using 
software.  Further, even business methods will very likely be allowable in 
the appropriate contexts.  We recommend that inventors pursue patent 
protection of their inventions with tempered expectations however, as 
conventionally broad recitations will likely be rejected with impunity, by 
both of the courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
In the remainder of this Article, we focus on avenues by which 
patent protection may be obtained for HIT analytics, even in the present 
environment. 
We begin by encouraging inventors to consider their inventions, not 
in terms of what they provide, but rather how they provide it.  In the HIT 
space, it is increasingly likely that virtually any patent claim will include, or 
otherwise can be distilled to, an “abstract idea” in view of current law.  This 
                                                 
 121. See Dennis Crouch, New Section 101 Decisions: Patents Invalid, PATENTLYO, 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/section-decisions-invalid.html (last visited Jan. 21, 
2015). 
 122. Peggy Focarino, Update on USPTO’s Implementation of ’Alice v. CLS Bank’, 
USPTO (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/blog /director/entry/update_on_uspto_s_ 
implementation (noting that previously issued “notices of allowance” had been withdrawn 
“due to the presence of at least one claim having an abstract idea and no more than a generic 
computer to perform generic computer functions”). 
 123. CLS Bank Int’l. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en 
banc) (Moore, J., dissenting in part), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 124. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014). 
 125. Id. at 2361 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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will be apparent from a review of the most recent guidance from the 
USPTO.  We argue however that applicants for patent protection may be 
well advised to embrace sweeping characterizations of their claimed 
inventions, or at least accept them, and subsequently demonstrate that the 
claim as a whole goes substantially beyond the abstract idea. 
We next look to case law for guidance, noting that many of the 
objections to software-implemented HIT patents could be traversed simply 
by reciting claims to inventions with clear and unambiguous boundaries.126 
We further propose that patent applicants consider squarely 
implementing available mechanisms for functional claiming, cautiously but 
unequivocally drafting at least some claims which are likely to be 
exceedingly narrow but also patent-eligible. 
A. Satisfying the Alice Test – Or: How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Abstract Idea 
The first step in the Alice test for patent eligibility is inherently 
plagued with contradictions. It is universally accepted that we must begin 
by determining whether a claim is directed to a judicial exception, such as 
an abstract idea.127  However, courts at every level expressly refuse to 
define exactly what an “abstract idea” entails.128  We find that a claim is 
“directed to” a judicial exception when an abstract idea “is recited (i.e., set 
forth or described) in the claim.”129  Yet, it is acknowledged that “at some 
level all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply a law of nature, 
natural phenomenon, or abstract idea,”130 at least strongly implying that an 
abstract idea must be identified as a preliminary step in any patent-
eligibility inquiry.131  Therefore, at least as a preliminary matter, it may be 
                                                 
 126. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 505–06 (2007) (“The boundaries of software and business 
method patents are inherently ambiguous.”). 
 127. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2014 
INTERIM GUIDANCE ON PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 10 (2014) [hereinafter USPTO 
INTERIM GUIDANCE], available at http://www.ipwatchdog.com/materials/interim-101-
guidance-12-2014.PDF. 
 128. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356–57 (refusing to “delimit the precise contours of 
the ‘abstract ideas’ category”). Indeed, some have analogized this task as being “evocative 
of Justice Stewart’s most famous phrase.” McRO, Inc. v. Atlus U.S.A., No. SACV 13-1870-
GW(FFMx), 2014 WL 4772196, at *5 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 22, 2014) (citing Jacobellis v. State 
of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring) (“I shall not today attempt further 
to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand 
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I 
see it . . . .”)). 
 129.  USPTO INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 11. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, 728 F.3d 1336, 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (rehearing en banc denied Dec. 12, 2013) (noting with respect to the 35 
U.S.C. § 101 inquiry that the court “must first identify and define whatever fundamental 
concept appears wrapped up in the claim”) (internal citations omitted). 
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prudent for the inventor to recognize that an abstract idea is present at some 
level of the invention being claimed. 
With respect to HIT inventions, this premise rings particularly true. 
Abstract ideas have been identified in USPTO guidance and “by the courts 
by way of example, including fundamental economic practices, certain 
methods of organizing human activities, an idea ‘of itself,’ and 
mathematical relationships/formulas.”132  As previously noted, the HIT 
inventions as contemplated in this Article are typically algorithmic in 
nature, analytical, predictive or otherwise provided for decision support, 
and often divorced from any specific device.  At a certain level, many of 
these inventions may arguably be characterized as including or embodying 
fundamental economic practices (e.g., cost-benefit analyses, resource 
allocation), ideas (e.g., intended results), or mathematical relationships 
(e.g., comparisons, statistical or other naturally occurring correlations).  
Some HIT innovations may even read directly upon specific examples 
identified by precedent, for example, those which involve: “comparing new 
and stored information and using rules to identify options;”133 “using 
categories to organize, store and transmit information;”134 “organizing 
information through mathematical correlations;”135 or “a formula for 
updating alarm limits.”136 
Part of the difficulty in devising a cogent theory for addressing 
patent eligibility is that, absent further guidance, different scholars, 
examiners and judges will have different perspectives on whether an 
abstract idea is present.  For example, some precedent indicates that an 
abstract idea will not be identified unless it is expressly recited in the claim 
language itself.137  Others have withdrawn entirely from the task of 
identifying an abstract idea outside the scope of controlling precedent.138  
However, most of the indications seemingly point to abstract ideas as 
derived from an overall understanding of the invention, a general purpose, 
an intended result, or other relevant generality. 
                                                 
 132. USPTO INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 127, at 13 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 
2355–56). 
 133. Id. at 14 (citing SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F.App’x 
950 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 134. Id. (citing Cyberfone Sys. v. CNN Interactive Grp., 558 F.App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 135. Id. (citing Digitech Image Tech., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 136. Id., (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)). 
 137. See, e.g., PNC Bank v. Secure Axcess, LLC, CBM2012-00100 (PTAB Sept. 9, 
2014) (rejecting eligibility challenge because the “Petitioner d[id] not tie adequately the 
claim language to the purported abstract concept,” nor was the purported concept squarely 
within established precedential boundaries for “abstract ideas”). 
 138. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (noting with respect to a patent claim at issue that “identifying the precise nature of 
the abstract idea is not as straightforward as in Alice or some of our other recent abstract idea 
cases.”). 
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Accordingly, we argue that for many patent applicants in this space, 
it makes sense to embrace a broad characterization of the “abstract idea” at 
the heart of an invention.  Rather than outright denial that the claim is 
directed to such an exception, the exception may be more effectively 
distinguished in view of the particular manner in which the invention is 
claimed.  Otherwise stated, an invention that is directed to a specific 
application of the exception does not preempt all applications of the 
exception and may therefore be considered patent-eligible, a tactic which is 
paradoxically easier in practice when the identified “abstract idea” is 
sweeping in breadth. 
The skeptical practitioner might reasonably argue that, for many 
USPTO and judicial proceedings, a preliminary finding that an abstract idea 
is present is effectively tantamount to ineligibility.  We do not dispute that 
attention to the second prong of the Alice test has often been cursory at best.  
However, this prong is nonetheless required by law, and we contend that 
HIT patent applicants should consider arguing that something “significantly 
more” than an abstract idea is recited, rather than trying to disentangle the 
Gordian Knot of “abstract idea” analysis. 
Some comfort may be taken in that the two-prong test from the 
Alice and Mayo opinions is at least facially more favorable for HIT patents 
than the previous “machine-or-transformation” (MOT) test.  Citing 
generously from Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Circuit in In re 
Bilski had fashioned the MOT test to serve as “the sole test governing § 101 
analyses,” wherein a process is only patent-eligible if: “(1) it is tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into 
a different state or thing.”139  The Supreme Court subsequently dialed back 
on the “sole test” requirement, but held that the MOT test was nonetheless 
“a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether 
some claimed inventions are patent eligible processes.”140  Under strict 
application of the MOT test, nearly all HIT inventions, as defined for the 
purposes of this Article, would typically be denied patent protection.  The 
contemplated HIT innovations are typically untethered with respect to any 
particular device or non-generic computing system, nor are they 
‘transformative’ so as to comply with legal precedent.141 
                                                 
 139. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954–56 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (“Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or 
thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular 
machines.”); Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 n.9 (noting that the Court has “only recognized a 
process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or 
operated to change materials to a ‘different state or thing.”)). 
 140. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). 
 141. See, e.g., Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654.F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (“The mere manipulation or reorganization of data, however, does not satisfy the 
transformation prong” of the MOT test). 
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B. Satisfying the Alice Test – Claiming Inventions with 
Particularity 
We argue that innovations in HIT are, however, clearly patent-
eligible in view of the Alice test if they are recited with an adequate degree 
of particularity.  Even assuming, arguendo, that an “abstract idea” may be 
at the heart of nearly every claimed invention,142 such claims may be 
eligible if they “also contain other elements or a combination of elements, 
sometimes referred to as an “inventive concept,” sufficient to ensure that 
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon “the 
abstract idea itself.”143  Succinctly put, inventions must be recited at a lower 
level of abstraction.  As is so often the case, “the devil is in the details,” and 
patent drafters may consider initially identifying any “abstract idea” or “law 
of nature” that underlies the invention at issue.  Rather than running away 
from the exception, it can be embraced and expressly distinguished through 
detail of implementation. 
An example of inventions which are claimed with varying degrees 
of abstraction may be instructive.  A claim drawn generically to any method 
of predicting the presence of a condition {x} in a patient would likely be 
ineligible.  Regardless of the type of condition, or whether the process was 
computer-implemented, this claim would likely be considered to preempt 
all uses of an abstract idea.  For a particular type of condition, simply 
adding steps, features or correlations which are inherent with respect to that 
condition would also fail to make the method eligible for patenting- even if 
there were no previously known processes for predicting such a condition.  
In other words, a new result of a generic process is not patent-eligible, but 
rather the process itself must include steps describing a particular way in 
which the result is achieved.  The steps may individually be known to 
experts in a given field, as long as the combination of steps amounts to one 
among many possible methods for predicting the presence of that condition. 
In Mayo, the Supreme Court looked to precedent to reinforce its 
conclusions as to what constitutes a claim to something ‘significantly more’ 
than the underlying exception.144  We can derive important clues from the 
same inquiries.  In Flook, the Court described the invention at issue as 
being ineligible for patenting, not merely because of the presence of an 
unpatentable formula, but also because the patent application did not 
“purport to explain how to select the appropriate margin of safety, the 
weighting factor, or any of the other variables,” nor “any disclosure relating 
to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process variables, or 
                                                 
 142. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 
(2012) (recognizing that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or 
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas”). 
 143. Id. at 1294. 
 144. Id. at 1298–1300. 
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the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system.”145  The 
Mayo Court contrasted these findings with the case in Diehr, wherein 
“additional steps of the process integrated the equation into the process as a 
whole.”146 
At a minimum, we must endeavor to identify and claim additional 
steps that integrate the “abstract idea” into a specific application.  
Otherwise stated, an invention is more likely to be patent-eligible if it is 
characterized as a specific solution to a specific problem associated with the 
abstract idea.  Generally reciting implementation of the abstract idea on a 
generic computer, using generic computer components, does not amount to 
“significantly more” than the abstract idea itself.147  Inventors should make 
sure, even where the intended result may be novel, that claimed steps do not 
themselves merely “consist of well-understood, routine, conventional 
activity already engaged in by the scientific community.”148  And those 
steps, when viewed as a whole, should add something “significant beyond 
the sum of their parts taken separately.”149 
Claim drafters may further consider the express recitation of 
underlying algorithms with respect to one or more claimed steps, either in 
the body of the claims themselves or as referenced from the specification.  
A hierarchy of flowcharts, for example, and perhaps more than one 
algorithm for certain steps in a primary (i.e., broadest) flowchart will 
typically preserve the greatest scope of protection.  Referring again to the 
aforementioned exemplary invention, where the process of predicting the 
presence of a condition {x} may include a step of comparing a measured 
value {y} with a value {z}, a sub-process for how this particular step is 
performed may in some cases be sufficient to render the claim as a whole 
eligible. 
From a practical perspective, it is self-evident that a hierarchy of 
claim scope is desirable, and detailed disclosure allows for maximum 
flexibility, not only in obtaining patent protection now, but also in 
sustaining the validity of a patent over time.  The likely tolerance of future 
generations for broad patent protection is impossible to foresee, and we 
would recommend that applicants practice diligence in the initial disclosure.  
For example, it may be stated of patent law generally that it “reflects a 
balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of 
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in 
the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”150  The Supreme Court has 
accordingly framed the “underlying functional concern [as] a relative one: 
how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the contribution of the 
                                                 
 145. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978). 
 146. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1298–99. 
 147. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014). 
 148. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). 
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inventor.”151  By expanding the scope of the contribution, i.e., the written 
description, at the outset, we are better able to respond to public 
reconsideration of the “social cost” of patents with respect to “legitimate 
competition and innovation.”152 
C. Taking Advantage of Statutory Allowances for Functional 
Claiming 
One added benefit of such detailed disclosure, although the mere 
mention may likely be decried by many within the patent bar, is that it 
enables the drafting of one or more “means-plus-function” (“MPF”) claims 
for certain software inventions.  Although instances of such claiming have 
progressively decreased over the years, we argue that these claims may 
offer not only a stronger likelihood of surmounting the threshold of § 101 
eligibility as opposed to alternative method step claiming, but may even 
provide broader scope in some cases. 
The statutory definition of MPF claim elements is governed by 35 
U.S.C. § 112(f).153  Section 112(f) was originally instituted by Congress to 
expressly allow for broad functional language in combination claims.154  
The Federal Circuit has held that the “‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ 
that an examiner may give means-plus-function language is that statutorily 
mandated in paragraph six.  Accordingly, the PTO may not disregard the 
structure disclosed in the specification corresponding to such language 
when rendering a patentability determination.”155  The Patent Office 
therefore must interpret MPF claim elements as “the structure, material or 
act described in the specification as performing the entire claimed function 
and equivalents to the disclosed structure, material or act,” such that these 
elements “will, in some cases, be afforded a more narrow interpretation 
                                                 
 151. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 152. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3255 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 
Dreyfuss, Are Business Methods Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 276 (2000)). 
 153. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012); see 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (1952) for inventions 
effectively dated prior to the America Invents Act. 
 154. See P. J. FEDERICO, COMMENTARY ON THE NEW PATENT ACT (1954), reprinted in 
75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161 (1993), which discusses the changes to section 
112: “The last paragraph of section 112 relating to so-called functional claims is new. It 
provides that an element of a claim for a combination (and a combination may be not only a 
combination of mechanical elements, but also a combination of substances in a composition 
claim, or steps in a process claim) may be expressed as a means or step for performing a 
specified function, without the recital of structure, materials or acts in support thereof. It is 
unquestionable that some measure of greater liberality in the use of functional expressions in 
combination claims is authorized than had been permitted by some court decisions, and that 
decisions such as that in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946), 
are modified or rendered obsolete, but the exact limits of the enlargement remain to be 
determined.” 
 155. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
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than a limitation that is not crafted in [MPF] format.”156  This promise of 
narrow interpretation has caused patentees to shun the usage MPF claims, 
but this lack of breadth may indeed be the salvation for claims which could 
otherwise be considered ineligible. 
As previously noted, when the disclosed structure or material is a 
computer programmed to carry out an algorithm, ‘the disclosed structure is 
not the general purpose computer, but rather that special purpose computer 
programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.’”157  Therefore, for MPF 
claim elements implemented by general purpose computers or processors, 
the corresponding structure must include the algorithm disclosed in the 
specification for performing the claimed function.158  Algorithms in this 
context are not required to include code, but rather may be expressed “in 
any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or 
as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure” to 
a person having ordinary skill in the art.159 
With respect to the patent eligibility inquiry, we suggest here that 
MPF claim elements will generally fall within the scope of patent-eligible 
subject matter.  By definition, disclosed algorithms may not be disregarded 
when considering patent-eligibility for MPF claim elements.160  At the very 
least, such claims would therefore be far more likely to pass muster than 
conventional method claims, all things otherwise being equal.  There is 
however no controlling Supreme Court precedent with respect to patent 
eligibility in the context of MPF claims.  In separate opinions from the en 
banc Federal Circuit CLS Bank decision, the presence of MPF claim 
elements was noted in some of the patentee’s dependent claims,161 but this 
issue was not addressed by the Alice Supreme Court. 
The multi-tiered disclosure which we advocate here may be 
particularly useful, not only for those who affirmatively implement MPF 
claim elements, but as added protection in the event of future shifts in the 
patent law.  Some prominent academics such as Professor Mark Lemley 
have advocated for courts to subject broad functional claims to the 
limitations of § 112(f), regardless of whether the term “means” has been 
                                                 
 156. MPEP, supra note 79, § 2181. 
 157. In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting WMS Gaming, Inc. 
v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 
1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 158. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); see also Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); WMS Gaming, Inc., 184 F.3d at 1349 . 
 159. Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340; see also Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Typhoon Touch Inc. v. Dell Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 160. MPEP, supra note 79, § 2181(II)(B). 
 161. CLS Bank Int’l. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting) (Moore, J., dissenting), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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implemented.162  Jurists may be taking notice, as in another opinion from 
the en banc Federal Circuit CLS Bank decision, Judge Linn cited such work 
and noted that “Congress could limit the scope of software patents by 
requiring functional claiming.”163  If strict application of § 112(f) 
limitations should ever be provided in the context of HIT inventions as 
contemplated herein, we would indeed find it most reassuring to have the 
flexibility of detailed disclosure in our patent specifications. 
The prudent inventor may nonetheless be concerned about the 
narrow scope of protection provided by MPF claim elements, but we 
believe that may be addressed with careful disclosure of the corresponding 
structure and algorithm.  Courts have consistently held that the algorithms 
supporting MPF limitations need only include the steps necessary to 
perform the claimed function.164  At the highest tier of structural definition, 
even a two-step algorithm may be relied upon as corresponding to the 
claimed function.165  Additional steps may of course be useful to clarify the 
invention, but can be provided in sub-processes, or in other words define 
additional tiers of detail for steps in the broader algorithm. 
PART IV. CONCLUSION 
Health care in the United States is suffering tremendously from 
rapidly escalating costs and inefficient care coupled with increasing 
demands.  A vital part of the answer to this problem is innovations in 
healthcare information technology and the best way to foster such ingenuity 
is to ensure that inventions in this field are able to be patented.  This Article 
proposes a two-fold solution.  First, the USPTO and courts should not 
categorically deem prospective inventions in HIT analytics patent-ineligible 
simply because they are implemented using software.  Second, patent 
applicants should embrace sweeping characterizations of their claimed 
inventions, recite claims with clear and unambiguous boundaries, and take 
advantage of the statutory allowances for functional claiming.  By doing so, 
these patents could achieve their constitutionally-mandated goal—to 
promote progress. 
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